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INTRODUCTION 
Reasonableness standards permeate the law. From the 
reasonable man standard used to measure negligent behavior in 
tort law1 to the requirement in criminal law that a person 
claiming self-defense must have reasonably believed that the force 
used was necessary to prevent an imminent unlawful attack,2 the 
                                                                                                                                  
  * Charles Kennedy Poe Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University 
Law School. A special thanks to Tom Clancy for inviting me to write and present this 
paper at the National Judicial College’s Annual Fourth Amendment Symposium in 
Oxford, Mississippi in March 2011. I appreciate thoughtful comments on this paper by 
Eric Miller, Fabio Arcila, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Josephine Ross, and David Gray 
when I presented it at Law and Society in San Francisco, California in June 2011. I 
thank Erin Mick for excellent research assistance. Parts of this Article have been 
adopted from Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the 
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403 (2010). 
 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). 
 2 See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR 
IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 131 (2003); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-
Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 
(1996). 
2 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
law demands more from us than simply our honest, good faith 
efforts. Across disciplines, the law requires that we act reasonably. 
Just as reasonableness standards permeate the law in 
general, reasonableness standards permeate the law regarding 
the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s definition of a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment turns on 
whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy was reasonable.3 
The Court’s definition of a “seizure” of the person turns on 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have 
felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police 
officer.4 Probable cause to search is defined as reasonable grounds 
to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be 
searched.5 Officers can conduct a Terry stop upon reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity and can do a Terry frisk of the 
person if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed 
and dangerous.6 And, increasingly, the validity of a search turns 
on whether the reviewing court believes the search was 
reasonable.7 
Because reasonableness plays such an important role in 
Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence, this Article assesses the 
past, the present, and the future of reasonableness analysis. Part I 
focuses on the past. For much of the twentieth century, the Court 
embraced what is called the warrant preference view of the 
Fourth Amendment under which the validity of a search turned 
on whether the police sought prior judicial authorization in the 
                                                                                                                                  
 3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 4 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980). 
 5 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The substance of all the 
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt . . . .” (quoting 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))); see also Kit Kinports, 
Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649 
(2009) [hereinafter Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause] (opining that by using 
phrases like “reasonable belief” and “reason to believe,” the Court risks conflating for 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards). 
 6 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As Lewis Katz notes, the Terry Court never 
used the term “reasonable suspicion.” Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A 
Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 486 (2004). The reasonable suspicion standard was 
articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
71 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 7 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
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form of a warrant based on probable cause issued by a magistrate 
judge. In case after case, the Court would announce that searches 
“conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well delineated exceptions.”8 Under the warrant preference model 
of reasonableness, a search was considered reasonable if the 
government obtained a search warrant prior to the search or an 
exception to the warrant requirement applied. 
Part II focuses on the present. Even though it still treats as 
reasonable both searches conducted pursuant to a warrant and 
searches that fall within a well-established exception to the 
warrant requirement, the modern Court has increasingly 
abandoned the warrant preference view. Instead of interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment as expressing a preference for warrants, 
the modern Court reads the text of the Fourth Amendment as 
simply requiring reasonableness.9 Under this textualist reading of 
the Fourth Amendment, commonly called the reasonableness 
view, a search or seizure is valid as long as it is reasonable.10 The 
Court, however, has provided lower courts with little guidance as 
to what makes a search or seizure reasonable, suggesting only 
that whether a search is reasonable requires a balancing of the 
government’s interests against the individual’s interests.11 
Reasonableness as balancing gives lower courts overly broad 
discretion to decide whether a search or seizure is reasonable. 
In a number of fairly recent cases, the modern Court has 
slightly revised the way it assesses the reasonableness of a search. 
In an effort to provide more guidance to lower courts, it has 
adopted what some have called an originalist approach.12 Under 
this approach, a reviewing court must first ask whether the 
                                                                                                                                  
 8 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 9 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not 
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are 
unreasonable.”). 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by [balancing].”). 
 12 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1739, 1760 (2000). 
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challenged governmental action was unlawful under the common 
law at the time of the Constitution’s framing.13 If so, then it will 
be considered unreasonable.14 If it is unclear whether the 
challenged governmental action was unlawful at the time of the 
framing, the reviewing court goes back to a balancing test, 
balancing the government’s interests against the individual’s 
interests.15 
Part III critiques the Court’s current focus on reasonableness 
as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis. It starts with 
what might be called the traditional critique of reasonableness. 
Under this critique, the current reasonableness inquiry is 
problematic because it provides insufficient guidance to lower 
courts and results in rulings that tend to be overly deferential to 
the government. Part III also provides the left critique of 
reasonableness. Under this critique, open-ended reasonableness 
balancing is problematic because it enables subconscious biases to 
influence the decision-making process both on the ground and in 
the courtroom. Implicit bias may lead police officers to see young 
men of color on the street as more suspicious than others, which 
may lead them to stop and search those individuals more 
frequently than others. Implicit bias may also lead courts to 
exercise their discretion to decide whether a search is reasonable 
in ways that favor law enforcement and disfavor blacks and 
Latinos who make up the bulk of individuals arrested, tried, and 
convicted of crimes in the United States. 
Part IV looks to the future. The Court today stands at a 
crossroads. It can completely replace the warrant preference 
model with the reasonableness model of the Fourth Amendment, 
as it has already done in a few cases, it can return to a robust 
embrace of the warrant preference view, or it can recognize the 
virtues of the warrant preference and the reasonableness models 
and improve upon both. I support continued adherence to the 
warrant preference view, but recognize that the Court is unlikely 
to return to a robust embrace of warrants. In light of this reality, I 
argue that the Court should continue its current path of 
                                                                                                                                  
 13 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999). 
 14 Id. at 299-300. 
 15 Id. 
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recognizing both models. Instead of extremely deferential pro-
government reasonableness balancing, however, courts should 
engage in a more stringent form of reasonableness review, review 
that I call “reasonableness with teeth.”16 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS: THE PAST 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.17 
Criminal procedure scholars and the Justices of the Supreme 
Court have debated the meaning of these words for years. The 
debate has centered on whether to interpret the Fourth 
Amendment as one interconnected text or as two separate clauses. 
As Justice Clarence Thomas explained in his dissent in Groh v. 
Ramirez, “The precise relationship between the Amendment’s 
Warrant Clause and Unreasonableness Clause is unclear. . . . 
[T]he Court has vacillated between imposing a categorical warrant 
requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard.”18 
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
embraced the warrant preference view of the Fourth Amendment, 
under which the validity of a search turned on the presence or 
                                                                                                                                  
 16 I am not the first to suggest a more rigorous form of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness review, see Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of 
Reasonableness, infra note 28, and Colb, The Qualitative Dimensions of Fourth 
Amendment “Reasonableness,” infra note 66, and I am not the first to borrow from the 
concept of rational basis with bite in the equal protection arena. Christopher Slobogin 
has suggested that “Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection 
rationality review ‘with bite,’ if not strict scrutiny.” CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY 
AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 42 
(2007) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK]. Slobogin proposes a two-tiered 
framework involving a proportionality principle and an exigency principle, which I 
discuss later in this paper. See infra text accompanying notes 171-82. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
6 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
absence of a search warrant.19 Under the warrant preference view 
of the Fourth Amendment, if the officer obtains advance judicial 
authorization for a search in the form of a search warrant or if a 
search falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, the search will be presumed reasonable. Adherents 
of the warrant preference view emphasize the importance of 
having a neutral, detached judicial officer, rather than a police 
officer, make the probable cause determination.20 
In response to the argument that the text of the Fourth 
Amendment does not require warrants or probable cause, 
proponents of the warrant preference view read the two clauses in 
the Fourth Amendment as interconnected and related. As Morgan 
Cloud explains, the warrant preference view employs a 
conjunctive theory that links the two clauses in the Fourth 
Amendment together such that a search is considered reasonable 
if it was conducted pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement applied.21 
Proponents of the warrant preference view also look to 
history to support their interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
They point out that the framers were primarily interested in 
protecting citizens against “arbitrary deprivations of privacy, 
property, and liberty.”22 Accordingly, when they drafted the 
Fourth Amendment, the framers sought to constrain executive 
discretion by subjecting search and seizure decisions to judicial 
                                                                                                                                  
 19 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 559 (1999) (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed 
what is now called the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, in which the use of a valid warrant . . . is the salient factor in assessing 
the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”);; James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: 
The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1124 
(1992) (“For most of the twentieth century, the Court has proclaimed its faith in the 
principle of neutral, judicial screening of executive decisions to search.”). 
 20 Id. at 1164 (“Neutral judicial determinations seem far preferable to those made 
by interested law enforcement agents.”);; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 9 (1977). 
 21 Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1707, 1721-22 (1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: 
Origins and Original Meaning 602-1791 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Claremont Graduate School) (on file with UMI Dissertation Service)). 
 22 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 1134. 
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control.23 While the framers may have focused primarily on the 
evils of general warrants and writs of assistance, they would have 
been equally concerned with warrantless searches had such 
searches been more common at that time because such searches 
would have resulted in similar harms.24 
Proponents of the warrant preference view argue that a 
warrant requirement with well-delineated exceptions provides 
more clarity than a general requirement that searches and 
seizures not be unreasonable.25 Police officers can more easily 
predict whether their actions will be considered constitutional 
under the warrant preference view than under an interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment that just tells them they need to act 
“reasonably.”26 This is because if they procure a warrant, there is 
little question that the subsequent search will be deemed valid. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS: THE PRESENT 
In contrast to the warrant preference view is what I call the 
separate clauses view, or what most call the reasonableness view, 
of the Fourth Amendment. Supporters of this view focus on the 
word “and” in the middle of the Fourth Amendment.27 They argue 
that the text of the Fourth Amendment is clearly divided into two 
separate and completely independent clauses—one stating that 
searches and seizures must not be unreasonable; the other 
specifying the requirements for a valid warrant.28 Supporters of 
                                                                                                                                  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 1135. 
 25 Id. at 1155. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
759 (1994); Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 
1280-88 (2010) [hereinafter Arcila, The Death of Suspicion]; Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the 
Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and 
Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 8 (2007) [hereinafter Arclia, In the Trenches]. 
 28 Amar, supra note 27, at 762 (noting that “[t]he Amendment contains two 
discrete commands—first, all searches and seizures must be reasonable; second, 
warrants authorizing various searches and seizures must be limited (by probable 
cause, particular description, and so on)”);; see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth 
Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to 
Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 724-25 (2007) (explaining that supporters 
of the reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment “argue that the plain text reveals 
no grammatical or logical relationship between the Warrant Clause and the 
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the reasonableness view argue that the original intent of the 
Framers “was to outlaw certain kinds of warrants [general 
warrants], not to enact a preference for warrants.”29 
Under the reasonableness view, a search comports with the 
Fourth Amendment as long as it is reasonable.30 The validity or 
reasonableness of the search does not turn on whether the 
government obtained a search warrant prior to the search.31 
Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are valid as 
long as they are reasonable.32 The probable cause requirement 
applies only when police seek a warrant.33 Reasonableness review 
consists of balancing the governmental interests against the 
individual’s interests.34 
The legislative history does not provide robust support for the 
separate clauses view of the Fourth Amendment. As Tom Clancy 
                                                                                                                                  
Reasonableness Clause”);; Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of 
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 999 [hereinafter Clancy, The Fourth 
Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness] (explaining that under the reasonableness 
view, “the Fourth Amendment’s two clauses are distinct: the first clause requires only 
that searches and seizures be ‘reasonable’;; the second clause addresses only those 
searches and seizures conducted under warrants . . .”);; Tracey Maclin & Julia 
Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2011) (reviewing 
William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602-
1791 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with 
UMI Dissertation Service)) (explaining that under the reasonableness view, the first 
clause “declares a freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures” while the second 
clause “specifies the form and content of search and arrest warrants”). 
 29 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 1130-31. 
 30 Amar, supra note 27, at 759. 
 31 Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. 
CT. REV. 49, 72 (“The natural reading of the [Fourth] amendment is that unreasonable 
searches and seizures are forbidden (clause 1), and specifically (clause 2) that a search 
(or arrest) warrant is invalid unless it complies with the specific requirements 
(probable cause, etc.) spelled out in the second clause.”). 
 32 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1969).  
 33 Amar, supra note 27, at 782 (“The ‘probable cause’ standard applies only to 
‘warrants,’ not all ‘searches’ and ‘seizures.’”);; Arcila, The Death of Suspicion, supra note 
27, at 1294 (“Only the Warrant Clause contains any textual support for a suspicion 
requirement . . . .”). 
 34 Daniel S. Lohse, Returning to Reasonableness: The Argument Against Expanding 
Investigatory Searches and Seizures to Completed Misdemeanors, 2010 U. ILL. L. Rev. 
1629, 1646; Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. Rev. 1461, 1467 & 1469; Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman” ‘s 
Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1796-97 (1994). 
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observes, the initial draft of the Fourth Amendment, prepared by 
James Madison, provided: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, 
their houses, their papers, and their other property, from 
all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated by warrants issued without probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly 
describing the places to be searched, or the persons or 
things to be seized.35 
In other words, it appears that the Framers were primarily 
concerned with preventing warrants issued without probable 
cause. They viewed as unreasonable searches and seizures 
conducted pursuant to such warrants. The initial draft of the 
Fourth Amendment clearly linked the two clauses together such 
that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
was violated when a warrant was issued without probable cause 
and without particularity of description. 
According to Clancy, the initial draft of the Fourth 
Amendment was referred to the Committee of Eleven, which 
consisted of one congressman from each state represented in 
Congress.36 The Committee revised the draft as follows: “The 
rights of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”37 
The amended draft, like the original draft, linked the two 
clauses such that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment 
would be violated if a warrant was issued without probable cause 
or particularity of description. Clancy notes that one Egert Benson 
                                                                                                                                  
 35 Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 515 (1995) (citing 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789)) (emphasis added). 
 36 Id. at 516. 
 37 Id. (emphasis added). The Committee of Eleven’s draft did not include any 
reference to “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. Clancy notes that this omission 
was inadvertent and the phrase was later re-inserted into the draft that became the 
Fourth Amendment as we know it today. Id. 
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of New York objected to the phrase “by warrants issuing” and 
wanted to replace these words with “and no warrant shall issue” 
because he felt the draft language was not forceful enough to 
convey the Framer’s strong disapproval of general warrants.38 
Benson’s proposal was defeated by a “considerable majority” of the 
House, but Benson, as chair of the committee that reported 
amendments out to the Senate, inserted this clause into the final 
draft.39 Somehow this change went unnoticed and the Fourth 
Amendment, as amended by Benson, was formally enacted.40 
Benson’s original intent may have been to bolster the idea that 
searches pursuant to general warrants, i.e., warrants issued 
without probable cause or not particularly describing the place to 
be searched or the person or things to be seized, were 
unreasonable, but proponents of the reasonableness view have 
interpreted the phrase “and no warrants shall issue” as divorcing 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures from 
the requirements of a valid warrant. 
The reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment was 
promoted by Akhil Amar in his 1994 Harvard Law Review article, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles.41 In this article, Amar argued 
the text of the Fourth Amendment does not require warrants or 
even probable cause.42 According to Amar, all the Fourth 
Amendment requires is that searches and seizures be reasonable, 
or at least not unreasonable.43 While the reasonableness approach 
was reflected in a few pre-1994 Supreme Court opinions,44 Amar’s 
                                                                                                                                  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 516-17. 
 41 Amar, supra note 27. 
 42 Id. at 761. 
 43 Id. at 801. 
 44 Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 937 (2010) (noting that “in the 1925 ruling in Carroll v. United 
States, [the Supreme Court] adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment did not 
condemn all warrantless searches, but only those that the justices did not find to be 
‘reasonable’ in the circumstances”). Some scholars point to two cases in the 1960s—
Camara v. Municipal Court and Terry v. Ohio—as marking the beginning of the 
Court’s turn away from the warrant preference view and its embrace of reasonableness 
balancing. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing 
the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 385 (1988) (“[T]his Article 
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work hastened its prominence. Over the past several decades, the 
Court has increasingly embraced the reasonableness view of the 
Fourth Amendment. In case after case, the Court has announced 
that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”45 Since 2000, only a few decisions have explicitly 
embraced the warrant preference view, the most recent of which 
was Arizona v. Gant, authored by former Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stevens.46 With Justice Stevens’s departure from the 
Court in 2010, the number of decisions strongly embracing the 
warrant preference view is likely to diminish even further. 
Another model of reasonableness that has started to emerge 
primarily in the opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas is 
what David Sklansky calls the Court’s “new Fourth Amendment 
originalism.”47 This approach, which can be considered a subset of 
the reasonableness view, appears to limit the discretion of 
reviewing courts by requiring them to look to common law 
precedent. As Justice Scalia explains, the Court must construe 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in terms of what was 
considered an unreasonable search when the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                                  
traces the Court’s fourth amendment analysis from the warrant clause’s dominance 
through the eventual enthronement by Camara and Terry of the reasonableness 
balancing test.”);; Reinert, supra note 34, at 1468-69 (opining that Camara and Terry 
“signaled the beginning of the end of the Warrant Clause’s centrality to Fourth 
Amendment inquiries”). 
 45 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”);; United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by [balancing].”);; 
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] ‘central 
requirement’ is one of reasonableness.”);; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992) 
(“[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment.”);; 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not 
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are 
unreasonable.”). 
 46 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“Consistent with our precedent, 
our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a 
warrantless search, with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))). 
 47 See Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1760. 
12 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
was adopted in 1791.48 Under this focus-on-the-common-law-
history approach, the reviewing court is supposed to first ask 
whether the challenged conduct was regarded as an unlawful 
search or seizure under the common law at the time when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.49 If the governmental activity in 
question would have been unlawful at the time of the framing, it 
will be deemed unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.50 If it is unclear whether the challenged conduct was 
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law, 
then the reviewing court must go back to assessing the 
reasonableness of the search by balancing the intrusion on privacy 
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.51 
Many believe the focus-on-the-common-law-history approach 
allows the Justices to reach the results they favor without 
appearing to be engaging in ideological favoritism.52 In Thomas 
Davies’s view, the common-law approach provides easy cover for 
the Justices to say that searches they want to approve are 
reasonable and searches they want to disapprove are 
unreasonable while appearing to reach these conclusions in a fair 
and neutral way.53 Davies doubts “whether even clear history can 
                                                                                                                                  
 48 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (“In determining whether a 
particular governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first 
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common 
law when the Amendment was framed.”);; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 950 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”). 
 49 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300. 
 52 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved 
Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—”Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 51, 55-56 (2010) [hereinafter Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?] 
(opining that when the Justices of the Supreme Court have looked to framing era 
common-law doctrine to assess the reasonableness of a search or an arrest, “they have 
frequently misstated the historical doctrine in ways that fit the desired result”);; see 
also Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 
MISS. L.J. 279, 287 (2004) (noting that “Judge Richard Posner has been particularly 
critical of this ‘originalist’ approach, suggesting that it is a sham, with a ‘judge . . . 
do[ing] the wildest things, all the while presenting himself as the passive agent of the 
sainted Founders—don’t argue with me, argue with Them’”). 
 53 Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?, supra note 52, at 53 (“Notwithstanding 
recent originalist rhetoric, the actual course of search-and-seizure decisions reveals 
 
2012] REASONABLENESS WITH TEETH 13 
provide much positive guidance for shaping specific responses to 
modern search and seizure issues.”54 This is because “[a]pplying 
the original meaning of the language of the Fourth Amendment in 
a completely changed social and institutional context would 
subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted 
the text.”55 Likewise, Donald Dripps notes that “too much has 
changed to enable modern judges to seek specific guidance from 
eighteenth-century common law practices.”56 Morgan Cloud has 
observed that the common-law approach is partial in two ways: (1) 
it is incomplete, “reviewing only a small fraction of the relevant 
historical data;”57 and (2) it is “partisan, selectively deploying 
fragments of the historical record to support their arguments 
about the Amendment’s meaning.”58 David Sklansky suggests two 
additional problems with the common-law approach to 
reasonableness. First, because early common-law authority is 
widely indeterminate, the approach allows the Court to pick and 
choose which precedent it wishes to follow.59 Second, since the 
framers were not necessarily concerned with issues regarding 
                                                                                                                                  
that the justices of the Supreme Court have made arrest and search decisions on the 
basis of the majority’s ideological predilections and then have sometimes advanced or 
concocted historical claims to justify their decisions.”). 
 54 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 736 (1999). 
 55 Id. at 740-41. 
 56 Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: 
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 
409 (2004). 
 57 Cloud, supra note 21, at 1707-08. 
 58 Id. at 1708. 
 59 Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1794. The Court itself acknowledged this problem in 
the Atwater case. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). In that case, a 
police officer arrested a woman named Gail Atwater for driving without a seatbelt, a 
fine only offense. Atwater was taken into custody and held in a jail cell until she was 
brought before a magistrate and released on bond. Ultimately, she was ordered to pay 
a $50 fine. Atwater brought a civil rights suit, alleging that the warrantless arrest for a 
fine only seatbelt violation constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. Atwater argued that police at early common law lacked the authority to 
make a warrantless arrest for a minor offense other than an offense involving breach of 
the peace. The Court rejected Atwater’s argument and upheld the warrantless arrest. 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, examined early common law and framing era 
authorities on police power to execute warrantless arrests and concluded that “the 
common law commentators (as well as the sparsely reported cases) reached divergent 
conclusions” on this issue. Id. at 328. 
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race, class, and gender, a focus on what was considered lawful at 
early common law might lead a reviewing court to overlook 
equality concerns.60 
Ironically, even though today’s Court does not accord the 
warrant preference view the premier status it once held, the Court 
still applies it in the bulk of its cases. If a search takes place with 
a valid search warrant, its constitutionality is presumed. If the 
government engages in a warrantless search and that search 
satisfies the requirements of a well-delineated exception to the 
warrant requirement, it too will be presumed reasonable. For 
example, in its recent 2011 decision in Kentucky v. King,61 the 
Court paid credence to both views of the Fourth Amendment. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito started by expressing 
adherence to the reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment, 
noting, “The text of the Amendment thus expressly imposes two 
requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. 
Second, a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is 
properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set 
out with particularity.”62 In the very next paragraph, Justice Alito 
paid credence to the warrant preference view, noting, “It is a basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law, . . . that searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.”63 Justice Alito even acknowledged that the 
warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions, including 
the exigent circumstances exception that was at issue in the 
case.64 
The Court today stands at a crossroads. It can return to a 
robust embrace of warrants, it can completely abandon the 
presumption of reasonableness that currently accompanies 
searches that take place with a search warrant and searches that 
fall within an exception to the warrant requirement, and instead 
require reasonableness balancing in all cases in which a search is 
challenged, or it can continue to recognize the merits of both the 
                                                                                                                                  
 60 Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1772-73. 
 61 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 64 Id. 
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warrant preference and reasonableness views. Given its current 
composition, the Court is unlikely to return to a robust embrace of 
the warrant preference view. Abandoning years of carefully 
developed Fourth Amendment doctrines, however, would be a 
mistake. The Court should recognize the strength of both models 
and improve upon their weaknesses. In the next Section, I outline 
why the Court should not completely replace the warrant 
preference model with the reasonableness model. In Part IV, I 
suggest that Fourth Amendment reasonableness review should be 
more rigorous and less deferential to the government than it is at 
present. In short, I propose that courts engage in reasonableness 
review with teeth. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S CURRENT FOCUS ON 
REASONABLENESS 
A. The Traditional Critique of Reasonableness 
The modern Court’s movement away from warrants and its 
embrace of reasonableness as the central meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment is problematic for several reasons. First, 
reasonableness review as currently applied in the Fourth 
Amendment context is highly deferential, resulting in decisions 
that usually uphold the challenged governmental action.65 As Tom 
Clancy has noted, when the Court engages in reasonableness 
balancing, instead of being evenhanded, it balances with its 
thumb on the scale in favor of the government.66 Fourth 
                                                                                                                                  
 65 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995);; Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990);; 
Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);; Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989);; United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 
531 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 66 Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, supra note 28, at 
1011; see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1687 (1998) [hereinafter Colb, The 
Qualitative Dimensions of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness”] (noting that in cases 
where the Court engages in reasonableness balancing, it applies a “relaxed and 
deferential approach”);; Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing as a process “in 
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Amendment reasonableness review is so deferential to the 
government that some scholars have compared Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness review to rational basis review in the 
equal protection context.67 Tracey Maclin, for example, notes that 
if the reviewing court “can identify any plausible goal or reason 
that promotes law enforcement interests,” the challenged police 
conduct will often be considered reasonable and not in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.68 
While it may make sense to defer to the government when 
the court is reviewing social and economic legislation that does not 
impact a suspect class or fundamental right, which is what courts 
usually do when applying rational basis review, reasonableness 
review in the Fourth Amendment context should not be 
deferential to the government. Fear of arbitrary searches and a 
desire to check the discretion of searching governmental officials 
prompted the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the 
Bill of Rights in the first place.69 The judiciary should be careful to 
defend its role of checking the executive when a fundamental right 
is at issue, especially when the bulk of individuals negatively 
impacted are poor persons of color.70 
                                                                                                                                  
which the judicial thumb apparently will be planted firmly on the law enforcement side 
of the scales”). 
 67 Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197, 199 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment] (“Fourth Amendment questions are resolved using a test that 
approximates the rational basis standard, which is the test used to decide equal 
protection and due process challenges to social and economic legislation.”);; William J. 
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 553, 554 (1992) (“The Supreme Court’s generalized ‘reasonableness’ standard 
resembles . . . rational-basis constitutional review . . . .”). 
 68 Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 67, at 200. 
 69 Id. at 201 (opining that “the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is 
distrust of police power and discretion”). 
 70 I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 65 
(2009) (“The collateral consequences of Terry and its progeny is that they permit the 
disproportionate targeting of minorities in cars, on buses, on planes, on foot, even in 
shopping malls.”);; Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 946, 977, 1030 (2002) (explaining why police are more likely to stop black people 
than white people when there is a choice between stopping one or the other); M. Chris 
Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as 
a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 
387-88 (2011) (noting that in New York City, police focus their attention on “poor 
communities of color” and that “[o]f the approximately 580,000 people stopped and 
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A second problem with the Court’s embrace of reasonableness 
is that the Court has failed to define reasonableness for Fourth 
Amendment review purposes, except to say that a search may be 
considered unreasonable if it was unlawful at the time of the 
framing.71 As a general matter, reasonableness review means the 
reviewing court must balance the government’s interests against 
the individual’s interests with little guidance from above.72 
Because the reviewing court is free to consider any circumstance it 
feels is relevant and disregard any circumstance it feels is 
irrelevant, the exercise of its unguided discretion can lead to 
inconsistent results. Many legal scholars have complained that 
since there are no standards to guide the court’s discretion, 
searches and seizures are reasonable under the reasonableness 
view if the reviewing court thinks they are reasonable.73 
The lack of guidance in Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
review is particularly striking given that on numerous occasions 
the Court has spoken of the importance of having bright line rules 
                                                                                                                                  
searched in New York City in 2009, nearly 90% were black or Latino, yet they were less 
likely to have committed an offense than white people”);; Jeffery Fagan & Garth Davies, 
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 458, 477 (2000) (noting “individuals of color are more likely 
than white Americans to be stopped, questioned, searched, and arrested” and 
referencing a New York City OAG Report showing “that stops were disproportionately 
concentrated in the city’s poorest neighborhoods, neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of racial minorities”);; David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable 
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 681 
(1994) (noting that poor law-abiding African Americans and Hispanics living in high 
crime areas are subject to search and seizure much more often than are whites); Kevin 
R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1047 (2010) (“Police regularly stop and search Blacks 
and Latina/os in larger numbers than their percentage of the general population . . . 
[and] these minority groups represented the overwhelming majority of searches 
(77.2%).”). 
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 47-51. 
 72 See supra text accompanying notes 34, 51. 
 73 Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?, supra note 52, at 55 (“The beauty of ‘Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness’—at least from the justices’ points of view—is that it can 
carry whatever content the justices choose to give it.”);; Gerald S. Reamey, When 
“Special Needs” Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 295, 299-300, 327 (1992) (arguing the reasonableness standard results in 
ad-hoc and unprincipled decision making); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (arguing that the “freewheeling 
‘reasonableness’ standard . . . suffers from the concerns about official arbitrariness”). 
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in the Fourth Amendment context to guide police officers who 
often need to make quick, on the spot decisions in the field.74 
When it comes to providing guidance to lower courts struggling to 
determine the validity of a search, however, the Court has 
eschewed bright-line rules in favor of a vague and amorphous 
reasonableness standard. 
B. The Critique of Reasonableness From the Left 
Beyond the traditional critique of reasonableness, both 
feminist theory and critical race theory offer additional insights. 
First, in purporting to be neutral and objective, a reasonableness 
standard can mask the fact that what the law considers 
reasonable is often just what those in positions of authority 
consider to be reasonable. As Dana Raigrodski notes, 
“reasonableness and common sense have always been assigned a 
race (white), a gender (male), and a class (wealthy).”75 
Gender, religion, race, class, and sexual orientation, to name 
just a few markers of identity, can influence not only the way one 
experiences life, but also the way one perceives the world. Judges 
ascribing to a colorblind model of jurisprudence might not fully 
appreciate the ways in which race and ethnicity may influence 
assessments of suspicion and criminality. An example of this can 
be seen in Anthony Thompson’s critique of the Terry v. Ohio 
decision.76 In Terry, the Court held that an officer’s decision to 
stop and frisk three men was not in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, even though the officer lacked probable cause to 
believe they were involved in criminal activity.77 The Terry Court 
established a new lower level of justification, later called 
reasonable suspicion, for brief investigatory seizures of the 
                                                                                                                                  
 74 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218 (1973). For critiques of the Court’s embrace of bright line rules, see Dripps, The 
Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition, supra note 56; Albert W. Alschuler, 
Bright-Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984). 
 75 Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the 
Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 187 (2008). 
 76 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999). 
 77 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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person.78 Chief Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion in 
Terry, recounted the facts of the case in entirely race-neutral 
terms, never revealing that Terry and one of his companions were 
black, and that Terry’s other companion and Detective McFadden 
were white.79 Thompson suggests that only when one considers 
race does Detective McFadden’s assertion—that he couldn’t say 
what precisely drew his attention to the defendants and that he 
just didn’t like them—make sense.80 
Terry v. Ohio is not the only opinion in which the Court 
describes the facts of the case in entirely race-neutral terms. In 
countless Supreme Court cases, the race of the defendant is never 
mentioned, as if irrelevant.81 This is in keeping with what Neil 
Gotonda identifies as our nation’s commitment to a color-blind 
ideology.82 Yet, as Tracey Maclin, Lenese Herbert, Devon Carbado, 
Andrew Taslitz, and others have noted, race is a relevant 
consideration when trying to determine the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure.83 For example, the test for a seizure is whether 
                                                                                                                                  
 78 Id. 
 79 Thompson, supra note 76, at 964. 
 80 Id. at 966. 
 81 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429 (1991); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Tracey Maclin, Race and 
the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 339-40 (1998) (“The majority opinion [in 
Garner] did not even acknowledge that Edward Garner, who was shot in the back of 
the head by a Memphis officer . . . was a skinny, unarmed black teenager.”);; Janice 
Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. 
REV. 153, 157 (noting that Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, the defendants in 
United States v. Drayton, were two young African American men); Carbado, supra note 
70, at 977 (“Nowhere in Justice O’Connor’s opinion does she entertain the possibility 
that Bostick may have been targeted because he is black. In fact, Justice O’Connor does 
not even mention Bostick’s race.”). 
 82 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1991). 
 83 Lenese C. Herbert, Bete Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National 
Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149 (2003) (critiquing the Court’s colorblind Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in Terry v. Ohio, Whren v. United States, and Illinois v. 
Wardlow); Carbado, supra note 70, at 977-88 (critiquing Justice O’Connor’s colorblind 
perspective reflected in Florida v. Bostick); Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 81, at 370-75 (arguing that since the Court allows a consideration of race 
when it benefits law enforcement, the Court should allow minority defendants to 
provide evidence of racial targeting as part of the reasonableness inquiry, which is a 
totality of the circumstances inquiry); Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment 
Disrespect: From Elian to Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2283 (2002) (arguing 
that in order to have a more “respect-based Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence” the 
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the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have felt 
free to leave or terminate the encounter.84 A young black male 
who has grown up in South Central Los Angeles knows that if he 
is stopped by a police officer, he should do whatever the officer 
says and not talk back unless he wants to kiss the ground. This 
young man may not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter 
with the officer, but if the reviewing court believes the average 
(white) person would have felt free to leave, then the encounter 
will not be considered a seizure and the young black male will not 
be able to complain that his Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated. 
It may be less easy for some to see the relevance of race and 
ethnicity to reasonableness in the search context, but the racial 
profiling literature suggests the importance of race in this context 
as well.85 While police officers may not consciously discriminate 
against black and brown suspects, implicit bias may color their 
perceptions of who looks and acts suspiciously, and thus who to 
stop, question, and search.86 Moreover, because police tend to 
focus their crime-fighting efforts in poor, high crime 
neighborhoods, which tend to be populated by poor minority and 
immigrant communities, poor black and brown individuals are 
more likely than other individuals to find themselves being 
stopped and searched.87 
                                                                                                                                  
subjective racial motives of the searching officer must be taken into account when 
determining whether the police action was reasonable). 
 84 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559-60 (1980). 
 85 DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 
(2002); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); 
David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); David A. 
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271; see also Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 45 (2003) (discussing the post 9/11 arguments in support of ethnic profiling). 
 86 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2035, 2039 (2011) (“[E]ven when officers are not intentionally engaged in 
conscious racist profiling, implicit biases can lead to a lower threshold for finding 
identical behavior suspicious when engaged in by blacks than by whites.”). 
 87 See Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive 
Conduct a Crime In High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 137 
(2002). 
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Numerous studies demonstrate that individuals tend to 
perceive blacks, particularly young black males, as threatening or 
aggressive. In one early study, subjects observed a purportedly 
live (actually bogus) dialogue between two men discussing 
whether an electrical engineer should stick with his present job at 
a modest but adequate salary or take a new job offering 
considerably more pay but no long-term security.88 The argument 
quickly heats up and results in one of the men shoving the other.89 
At this point, subjects were asked to characterize the behavior of 
the man who shoved the other man.90 Sixty-nine percent of the 
subjects saw the shove as violent when both men were black.91 In 
contrast, when both men were white, only thirteen percent of the 
subjects found that the same behavior was violent.92 When the 
man shoving was black and the man being shoved was white, 
seventy-five percent saw the shove as aggressive.93 When the man 
doing the shoving was white and the man being shoved was black, 
only seventeen percent saw the shove as aggressive.94 
The available research also shows a tendency to equate 
blackness with criminality.95 A 2002 study tested subjects on their 
ability to accurately assess danger from individuals holding 
various objects.96 Researchers developed a simplistic videogame 
that presented a series of background and target images.97 Ten 
African American and ten white young men were recruited on 
                                                                                                                                  
 88 Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup 
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 590, 593 (1976) (testing 104 white undergraduates at the University of 
California at Irvine). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 595. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty 
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010) (finding that subjects held 
implicit associations between blacks and the status of being guilty). 
 96 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officers Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002). 
 97 Id. at 1315. 
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college campuses to pose as targets.98 Each target appeared in the 
game four times—twice with a gun and twice without a gun, with 
a different object and in a different pose each time.99 To play the 
game, subjects needed to decide as quickly as possible whether the 
target was holding a gun or not.100 If the target was holding a gun, 
the subject was supposed to shoot him by pushing a button labeled 
shoot on the right side of a button box.101 If the target was holding 
some object other than a gun, the subject was told to press a 
button labeled don’t shoot on the left side of the button box.102 A 
correct hit, i.e., correctly shooting a target with a gun, earned ten 
points; and a correct rejection, i.e., refraining from shooting a 
target with an object other than a gun, earned five points.103 A 
false alarm, i.e., shooting a target holding an object other than a 
gun, resulted in a penalty of minus twenty points; a miss, i.e., not 
shooting a target holding a gun, resulted in a penalty of forty 
points.104 This was to replicate the “payoff matrix” experienced by 
police officers on the street “where shooting an innocent suspect is 
a terrible mistake (as in the case of Amadou Diallo), but where the 
stronger motivation is presumably to avoid misidentifying an 
armed and hostile target, which could result in the officer’s 
death.”105 
Researchers found that subjects fired at an armed target 
more quickly if he was black than if he was white.106 Subjects 
were also quicker to refrain from shooting armed white targets 
than armed black targets.107 The study thus showed not only that 
innocent blacks are more likely than innocent whites to be shot, it 
also showed that individuals are in a more vulnerable position 
when dealing with armed white individuals than when dealing 
with armed black individuals because they are slower to recognize 
                                                                                                                                  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1315-16. 
 102 Id. at 1316. 
 103 Id. at 1317. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
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that white targets are armed. Shooter bias was evident not only in 
white subjects, but also in African American subjects.108 
Much of the research on implicit bias suggests that when 
individuals have to make quick, split-second decisions, implicit 
bias may limit their ability to control for racial bias caused by 
stereotypes and prejudice.109 The research also suggests that 
making race salient can help egalitarian-minded individuals to 
suppress what would otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent 
responses and to act in a more egalitarian manner.110 This 
research suggests the possibility that judges, who have more time 
to deliberate than police officers on the street, might be less prone 
to the ill-effects of implicit bias. The available research, however, 
shows that judges, just like other individuals, are influenced by 
implicit race bias.111 It also suggests that judges can and do 
compensate for their own implicit racial bias, at least when race is 
made salient and the judges are attempting to render racially 
neutral decisions.112 
In a 2009 study, Jeff Rachlinski, Sherri Lynn Johnson, 
Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie studied the effects of implicit 
bias on 133 trial judges who were given three hypothetical cases, 
                                                                                                                                  
 108 Id. at 1324, 1327. 
 109 B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended 
Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 288 (2006) (when 
participants had to make a snap judgment as to whether an object was a gun or a 
harmless object, they falsely saw a gun more often when primed with a black face than 
when primed with a white face). 
 110 William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing 
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 811 (2004) (finding that “unwanted 
prejudicial responses are most likely to occur under conditions of distraction or 
cognitive overload, when reflective cognitive processes that might modulate an 
automatically activated evaluation are otherwise engaged”);; Patricia G. Devine, 
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 12, 14 (1989) (finding that when racial stereotypes 
about blacks were made salient, low-prejudice individuals seemed to consciously 
mediate their thoughts about blacks and align their thoughts with their egalitarian 
beliefs, but when race was not made salient, they responded in stereotype-congruent 
ways). For a fuller description of these and other studies, see Cynthia Lee, The Gay 
Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536-49 (2008). 
 111 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial 
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (finding that judges hold implicit racial 
biases that can influence their judgment). 
 112 Id. 
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one involving a juvenile shoplifter, a second involving a juvenile 
robber, and a third involving a battery.113 Suspecting “that the 
judges might respond differently depending upon whether . . . the 
race of the defendant [was] salient,” the researchers did not 
explicitly identify the race of the defendant in the first two 
scenarios, but used a subliminal priming mechanism to do so 
indirectly, while explicitly identifying the defendant as either 
Caucasian or African American in the third hypothetical.114 
Rachlinski found that in the first two experiments where the 
race of the defendant was not identified explicitly, judges who 
exhibited a white preference on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
gave harsher sentences to defendants if they had been primed 
with black associated words rather than neutral words.115 In other 
words, judges who had implicit bias in favor of whites were more 
likely to be harsher in their sentencing of black defendants than 
in their sentencing of similarly situated white defendants. Judges 
in the third experiment, where the race of the defendant was 
identified explicitly, did not judge the white and black defendants 
differently.116 Most of the judges in the third experiment reported 
that they suspected racial bias was being studied, even though the 
only cue they received was the explicit mention of the defendant’s 
race.117 This study suggests the usefulness of making race salient 
—perhaps by defense attorneys calling attention to the possibility 
of implicit racial bias affecting perceptions of dangerousness, 
criminality, and threat—when the case involves a black 
defendant. 
The problematic nature of open-ended reasonableness 
standards has led some feminist scholars to argue in favor of more 
subjective standards over purportedly neutral objective ones. In 
the self-defense context, for example, some feminist scholars have 
argued that battered women who kill their abusers in non-
confrontational situations should not be held to the usual 
reasonable person standard but should be compared to the 
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average battered woman.118 In the Fourth Amendment context, 
Dana Raigrodski urges the Court to abandon reasonableness 
standards altogether.119 
While I agree with the concerns raised by Raigrodski and 
others, I do not see the Court jettisoning reasonableness as the 
cornerstone of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence anytime soon. 
Moreover, even if it wanted to, it would be difficult for the Court to 
abandon reasonableness as a requirement for a valid search or 
seizure. The text of the Fourth Amendment includes an explicit 
command that searches and seizures not be unreasonable. Rather 
than abandoning reasonableness, the Court should require more 
rigorous scrutiny of government claims of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. It should also provide more guidance to lower 
courts as to when a search ought to be deemed reasonable or 
unreasonable. Such guidance can minimize problems of 
inconsistency and arbitrariness. It can also lead to fairer results 
as possibilities for subconscious bias to influence the decision-
making process would be restricted. 
IV. THE FUTURE: A HYBRID APPROACH 
In other work, I have suggested that the Court should 
embrace a more rigorous standard of reasonableness review—a 
standard I call “reasonableness with teeth.”120 Looking outside the 
criminal procedure arena, I borrow from a small slice of the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and draw lessons from 
three cases in which the Supreme Court utilized rational basis 
review to strike down the challenged legislation as 
unconstitutional. In this Part, I first examine the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                  
 118 See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE 
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000) (arguing that a reasonable woman 
standard should be adopted in certain legal contexts); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 415 (1988) (arguing that since courts 
in self-defense cases consider at least some of the defendant’s attributes and 
circumstances, they should likewise permit an instruction directing the jury to 
measure the defendant’s actions against those of the reasonable battered woman). 
 119 Raigrodski, supra note 75, at 214-15. 
 120 Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing 
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us about the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1403 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops]. 
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“rational basis with bite” jurisprudence. Next, I examine possible 
arguments against importing rational basis with bite into the 
Fourth Amendment context. I focus my attention here on Richard 
Worf’s use of political process theory to defend judicial deference 
to the legislature in cases involving suspicionless searches.121 
Finally, I discuss a few ways the Court might implement a more 
rigorous form of reasonableness review. 
Under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, if a law 
burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, such as 
race, alienage, or national origin, the reviewing court must apply 
strict scrutiny review, striking down the legislation unless it is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.122 
If the legislation discriminates on the basis of gender, the Court 
will apply heightened or intermediate scrutiny, striking down the 
legislation if it fails to substantially further an important 
governmental purpose.123 If a law does not target a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, the Court will uphold the legislation as long 
as the classification “bears a rational relation to some legitimate 
end.”124 
In most cases, the level of scrutiny employed predetermines 
whether the legislation will be struck down as constitutionally 
infirm or upheld. If strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny 
applies, the legislation will almost always be struck down. As 
Gerald Gunther put it, strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory, [but] 
fatal in fact.”125 On the other hand, if rational basis review is the 
applicable standard, the legislation will almost always be 
upheld.126 The Court applying rational basis review is supposed to 
                                                                                                                                  
 121 Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless 
Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007) [hereinafter Worf, The Case for 
Rational Basis Review]. 
 122 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 123 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that intermediate scrutiny has 
been applied to discriminatory classifications based on illegitimacy); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (gender classifications subjected to 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 124 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 125 Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 126 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. 
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defer to the legislature because it is presumed that even 
improvident or unwise social or economic legislation will 
eventually be corrected through the democratic process.127 
In three rare cases, which Cass Sunstein calls the “Moreno-
Cleburne-Romer Trilogy,”128 the Court utilized rational basis 
review but struck down the legislation in question. What the three 
cases had in common was that the legislation in question in each 
case affected a politically unpopular group. The legislation in 
Moreno was aimed at preventing poor, unrelated persons living 
under one roof from being eligible for food stamps.129 The 
ordinance in Cleburne made it more difficult for a group home for 
the mentally disabled to qualify for a zoning permit,130 and the 
legislation in Romer prohibited any governmental action designed 
to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination.131 
Instead of rubber-stamping the legislation in question as it 
usually does when it applies rational basis review, the Court 
struck down the challenged enactments in each of these cases on 
equal protection grounds.132 The Court went out of its way to note 
that a desire to harm a politically unpopular group (hippies in 
Moreno, mentally disabled persons in Cleburne, and gays and 
lesbians in Romer) is not a legitimate governmental interest. 
Commentators have called the less-deferential-than-usual rational 
basis review that was exercised in these cases “rational basis 
review with a bite.”133 
Borrowing from the Court’s “rational basis with bite” 
jurisprudence, I suggest that courts deciding the validity of a 
search should conduct a more rigorous inquiry into the overall 
reasonableness of the search. In other words, the reviewing court 
should apply reasonableness review with teeth. The reviewing 
court should resist the urge to defer to the government whenever 
a criminal defendant challenges a search as unconstitutional. It 
should stop balancing with its thumb on the scale in favor of the 
                                                                                                                                  
 127 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
 128 Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59, 61 (1996). 
 129 USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530, 534-35 (1973). 
 130 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37. 
 131 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
 132 See Sunstein, supra note 128, at 59-63. 
 133 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 126, at 327; Gunther, supra note 125, at 18-19. 
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government. It should start rigorously questioning whether the 
challenged governmental action ought to be upheld. It should 
scrutinize whether the government had good reason for engaging 
in the challenged action and whether there were good reasons for 
the government acting without advance judicial authorization. 
In proposing “reasonableness with teeth,” I do not suggest 
that the Court simply import what it has done in the equal 
protection context into the Fourth Amendment context. One 
problem with borrowing from the Court’s “rational basis with bite” 
jurisprudence is that the Court has provided little guidance 
regarding when “rational basis with bite” is appropriate and 
virtually no guidance with respect to what “rational basis with 
bite” means besides heightened judicial scrutiny of the challenged 
governmental action.134 Another problem is that the Court applies 
deferential rational basis review in most equal protection cases 
and applies non-deferential “rational basis with bite” in only a 
small minority of cases.135 
Reasonableness with teeth in the Fourth Amendment context 
need not replicate these problems. First, factors relevant to 
whether a search should be deemed reasonable can and should be 
spelled out in advance—reducing vagueness and lack of guidance 
concerns. Second, it is unnecessary to limit reasonableness with 
teeth to cases in which a politically unpopular group has been 
disadvantaged.136 Non-deferential reasonableness review should 
                                                                                                                                  
 134 See Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops, supra note 120, at 1492. 
 135 See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court 
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apply in all cases where the validity of a search is at issue, not 
simply those cases implicating a politically unpopular group. Since 
the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be 
reasonable, not just those directed at politically unpopular groups, 
reasonableness is already required for all searches and seizures. 
The only question is what form reasonableness review ought to 
take. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires that 
reasonableness review be deferential to the government.137 
Indeed, given the concerns that motivated the Framers to include 
the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights (the desire to 
constrain arbitrary and exploratory governmental searches and 
seizures), a non-deferential standard of review is more 
appropriate than a deferential, pro-government standard of 
review.138 
I do not suggest that the Court completely abandon all of the 
doctrines it has carefully established over the years. While I feel 
several Fourth Amendment doctrines are in desperate need of 
reform, such as the consent doctrine and the administrative 
search doctrine, the basic idea behind the warrant preference view 
                                                                                                                                  
Process and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20-21 (1996) 
(arguing that criminal suspects as a group find it hard or impossible to protect 
themselves through the political process). Moreover, the vast majority of criminal 
defendants are poor and/or black or Latino. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law 
Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 257 (2009) (noting 
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Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimaging Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 962 (2010) 
(“Although African Americans comprise less than thirteen percent of the U.S. 
population, thirty-eight percent of our country’s two million prison inmates are black.”);; 
Anthony O’Rourke, The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 721, 734-35 & n.47, 737 (2011) (explaining that “race and class disparities 
intersect to concentrate the burdens of incarceration among the most socially 
disadvantaged groups of individuals” with the result that “poor and minority 
individuals (who . . . constitute the vast majority of criminal defendants)”);; William J. 
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970-71 (2008) (“African Americans 
constitute 13% of the general population, but nearly half of a record-high prison 
population.”). 
 137 See Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops, supra note 120, at 1492. 
 138 See Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 67 
(arguing that the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power 
and discretion). 
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—that searches that take place with a search warrant and 
warrantless searches that fall within an exception to the warrant 
requirement ought to be presumed reasonable—is sound. Indeed, I 
believe the wisest course of action is to continue to adhere to the 
warrant preference view and strengthen the warrant process. 
Because the Court has clearly indicated this is not the path it 
intends to pursue, I offer reasonableness with teeth as an 
improvement on current reasonableness balancing. Instead of 
simply balancing the government’s interests against the 
individual’s interests, a process that in today’s post-9/11 world is 
likely to almost always result in a conclusion that the 
government’s interests outweigh the individual’s interests, courts 
should engage in non-deferential review of the reasonableness of 
the search or seizure in question. 
My focus here is less on how non-deferential reasonableness 
review ought to be implemented than on why non-deferential 
reasonableness review ought to be embraced in light of 
increasingly popular proposals to shift Fourth Amendment 
decision making from the province of the judiciary to the province 
of the legislature. For example, Richard Worf has argued that 
judges should generally defer to legislative judgments regarding 
the reasonableness of suspicionless group searches because 
legislatures are better able than courts to serve democratic 
interests.139 Worf relies on political process theory, the idea that 
when a constitutional provision is ambiguous, “the majoritarian 
decision[s] of the legislature should . . . be preferred [over] the 
decisions of unelected and unaccountable judges.”140 
Worf starts by claiming that in the Fourth Amendment 
arena, “[t]he Court essentially applies strict scrutiny in every 
case” because it balances de novo and does not defer to legislative 
judgments.141 It is difficult to see how Worf can conclude that the 
Court is applying strict scrutiny when it engages in 
reasonableness balancing. In most cases, once the Court finds a 
special need above and beyond the normal need for law 
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enforcement, it concludes that the government’s interests 
outweigh the individual’s interests.142 
Perhaps the problem is in the way Worf conceives of 
reasonableness. Worf equates reasonableness in the Fourth 
Amendment context with cost-effectiveness.143 He writes, 
“Reasonableness must, in some sense, mean only cost-
effectiveness.”144 I take issue with the proposition that if 
something is cost-effective, then it must be reasonable. Take, for 
example, a corporation that manufactures widgets with a defective 
part. Even if research suggests that a user of this widget stands a 
one percent chance of being maimed or disfigured, the 
corporation’s board of directors might decide to continue 
manufacturing the widget after weighing the costs and benefits 
because it thinks the risk of the defect being discovered is small. 
Additionally, the board may conclude that even if someone is 
injured and sues, the cost to settle such a lawsuit will likely be 
less than the profit the corporation stands to gain from 
manufacturing the widget without disclosure. Cost-effective? 
Perhaps. Reasonable? No. Reasonableness in other contexts, such 
as the self-defense doctrine, is recognized as including a normative 
component.145 Reasonableness in the search and seizure context 
ought to include a normative component as well. 
Building on this idea that reasonableness in the Fourth 
Amendment context means cost-effective, Worf provides five 
reasons why he thinks legislatures would be better able than 
courts to decide questions regarding the reasonableness of a 
suspicionless group search regime. First, he argues that 
“legislatures have a developed capacity to register the costs and 
benefits of a practice.”146 Second, legislatures “have better access 
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to the relevant facts.”147 Courts only have the facts of the 
particular case before them. Legislatures, in contrast, can “seek 
out facts instead of relying simply on those that interested parties 
put before them.”148 Third, Worf thinks legislatures have more 
legitimacy than courts because ordinary people can be involved in 
setting policies that affect them.149 Fourth, Worf argues that 
“legislatures can [better] accommodate local variations in 
reasonableness.”150 The Supreme Court, in contrast, sets 
standards of reasonableness that apply nationwide. Fifth, Worf 
argues that legislatures are better able than courts to adapt to 
changed circumstances because courts are bound by rules of stare 
decisis.151 
Worf’s arguments are similar to arguments made by my 
colleague, Orin Kerr, who suggests that legislatures, not courts, 
ought to be entrusted with protecting citizen privacy interests vis-
a-vis new technologies.152 Kerr provides three reasons why he 
believes courts should defer to legislatures when it comes to 
questions regarding the privacy implications of evolving 
technologies. First, because courts are resolving disputes arising 
from past events, Fourth Amendment rules tend to lag behind 
parallel statutory rules and current technologies.153 Given the way 
our criminal justice system works, it can take a long time before 
an issue is resolved by the Supreme Court.154 The Court generally 
does not step in until after the circuit courts of appeals have 
addressed an issue, and usually only to resolve a circuit split. 
Second, Kerr notes that “[j]udicial rulemaking is limited by strong 
stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change 
quickly.”155 Legislatures, in contrast, can respond more quickly to 
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changing facts.156 Finally, Kerr notes that “[l]egislative rules tend 
to be the product of a wide range of inputs,” whereas judicial rules 
are the result of “written briefs and oral arguments by [only] two 
parties.”157 
Both Worf and Kerr argue that those affected by the searches 
they discuss (suspicionless group searches in Worf’s case and 
searches involving new technologies in Kerr’s case) can adequately 
protect themselves through the political process.158 Worf claims 
that the typical searched or seized group—students subjected to 
drug testing, people who ride the subway, or drivers who drive on 
a particular highway—is medium-sized and therefore well 
positioned to achieve their aims through the political process.159 
He argues that such groups “have numerous members, so they 
have the economies of scale that individuals lack.”160 He also 
claims they “are not so large that collective action and free rider 
problems are [avoided].”161 Realistically, however, how many 
people who ride the subway in New York City are going to take 
the time to try to band together to complain about random subway 
searches? How would drivers who use a particular route contact 
other similarly situated drivers so as to lodge a complaint about 
an objectionable checkpoint? And even if they were successful in 
organizing like-minded individuals in protesting a particular 
checkpoint, how likely is it that the legislature would actually 
listen to them and eliminate the checkpoint after the legislature 
has weighed the alternatives and made the decision to establish 
the checkpoint? Not likely. 
Kerr makes a similar argument with respect to advances in 
technology.162 He notes that the main consumers of new 
technologies, like the computer and the Internet, are affluent 
white majorities.163 Kerr argues that “[s]uch users generally will 
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be able to represent their interests before Congress effectively, 
resulting in a healthy debate and relatively favorable [outcomes] 
for balanced legislative rules.”164 While it may be true that 
affluent whites use computers and the Internet in greater 
numbers than poor minorities, to date, I have not seen affluent 
whites banding together to ask Congress to pass legislation 
curtailing the government’s practice of engaging in suspicionless 
searches of laptops at international airports.165 
The main reason courts should not defer to legislatures when 
it comes to Fourth Amendment questions rests on institutional 
competency and separation of powers grounds.166 The judiciary 
should not defer to the legislature in matters involving the Fourth 
Amendment because the judiciary has the primary authority over 
matters involving constitutional interpretation.167 This is 
particularly true in cases affecting the interests of a “discrete and 
insular minorit[y].”168 In almost all Fourth Amendment cases, the 
affected individuals are criminal defendants, individuals who have 
been charged with a crime, who arguably constitute a “discrete 
and insular minorit[y].”169 Because this particular group is an 
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 169 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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unpopular and disfavored group, it is unlikely to find redress in 
the majoritarian legislature.170 
What might reasonableness with teeth look like in practice? 
Reasonableness review with teeth could take any number of 
forms. Without choosing one form over another, I examine a few 
possibilities here. 
First, the current model of open-ended reasonableness 
balancing could be replaced with Christopher Slobogin’s two part 
proportionality and exigency framework.171 Slobogin suggests that 
all searches should first satisfy a proportionality principle.172 
Proportionality, as explained by Slobogin, means the justification 
for the search must be roughly proportionate to its 
intrusiveness.173 If the search in question is extremely intrusive, 
then the government needs a stronger justification to engage in 
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that search.174 Slobogin suggests the use of hit rates to measure 
the strength of the government’s justification.175 Second, under 
Slobogin’s proposed framework, unless there are exigent 
circumstances, the government must obtain ex ante authorization 
for the search.176 Slobogin explains that such advance 
authorization does not always have to take the form of a warrant 
based on probable cause issued by a judicial magistrate.177 
Slobogin’s proposed framework makes a lot of sense. Unlike 
the current reasonableness balancing test, which allows the 
reviewing court to pick and choose which factors it considers 
relevant, Slobogin’s proportionality principle tells the reviewing 
court it must focus on intrusiveness and hit rates.178 Unlike the 
current model of reasonableness balancing, which encourages the 
reviewing court to place its thumb on the scale in favor of the 
government in assessing the government’s interests against the 
individual’s interests, Slobogin’s proportionality principle looks at 
hit rates or likelihood of success, not the importance of the 
                                                                                                                                  
 174 SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 16, at 38 (explaining, for example, that 
extremely invasive actions such as “bodily surgery, perusal of private diaries, and 
prolonged undercover operations . . . should take place only if there is clear and 
convincing proof that the evidence thereby sought is crucial to the state’s case);; 
Slobogin, Government Dragnets, supra note 171, at 139; Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry, 
supra note 171, at 1082-84 (explaining a four-tiered approach where the level of 
intrusiveness dictates the justification required ranging from clear and convincing 
evidence to probable cause to reasonable suspicion to a relevance standard); Slobogin, 
The World Without a Fourth Amendment, supra note 171, at 68 (“[F]or example, the 
government would generally have to show a higher degree of confidence that a search 
will be successful when evidence is thought to be in a private home than when it is 
believed to be in a warehouse or in the ‘open fields.’”). 
 175 SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 16, at 41-42; Slobogin, Government 
Dragnets, supra note 171, at 139; Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry, supra note 171, at 
1088. 
 176 SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 16, at 44 (“[W]hen there is no exigency, 
ex ante review of the search by some independent official should be preferred—a tenet 
this book will call the exigency principle.”);; Slobogin, Government Dragnets, supra note 
171, at 141; Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, supra note 171, at 75 
(explaining that the exigency principle entails that “whenever some level of 
justification is required, authorization by a neutral third party should be obtained in 
all nonexigent situations”). 
 177 Slobogin, Government Dragnets, supra note 171, at 141. 
 178 Id. at 139 (“Under proportionality reasoning, the more intrusive a dragnet 
program is, the higher its hit rate must be.”). 
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asserted governmental interest.179 Slobogin’s proportionality 
principle also requires the reviewing court to consider the 
intrusiveness of the government action on the individual or 
individuals who are subjected to the search.180 The only problem 
with Slobogin’s proposal is that he would exempt most of the 
suspicionless group searches, searches he calls “government 
dragnets,” from his proposed framework.181 In many government 
dragnet cases, Slobogin would follow Richard Worf’s deference to 
the legislature approach.182 The reviewing court would be 
encouraged to simply rubber stamp the government’s search 
regime as long as a legislative body was responsible for creating 
and implementing it. 
A second way to achieve less deferential reasonableness 
review is by embracing a multidimensional balancing approach, 
such as the one proposed by Alexander Reinert.183 Under Reinert’s 
proposal, courts reviewing the reasonableness of a search should 
recognize that the “public interest” is multifaceted and includes 
collective values that are actually in harmony with individual 
liberties. Reinert identifies two categories of collective interests 
ignored by the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence: 
participatory pluralism and efficient administration of the 
criminal justice system. Reinert explains that when an individual 
is subjected to a Fourth Amendment intrusion, he may be less 
likely to participate in civic activities in the future out of fear that 
he may expose himself to more such intrusions.184 This is 
particularly true if the individual feels he was singled out because 
of his membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.185 
Reinert points to the post-9/11 intrusions on Arab, Muslim, and 
South Asian communities as an example of how Fourth 
Amendment intrusions can negatively affect civic participation.186 
He notes that “in the wake of widely held reports of law 
                                                                                                                                  
 179 Id. at 140. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 109-10. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Reinert, supra note 34. 
 184 Id. at 1487-89. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 1488. 
38 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
enforcement tracking and prosecuting donations to particular 
Islamic charities in this country, civic participation of Muslim 
communities steeply declined.”187 
Reinert identifies a second collective interest that is impinged 
upon by Fourth Amendment intrusions: the efficient 
administration of criminal justice.188 Reinert notes that as the 
Court has relaxed the justification required for certain kinds of 
Fourth Amendment intrusions, the likelihood that innocent 
individuals will be intruded upon increases.189 For example, the 
Court’s move in Terry v. Ohio from requiring probable cause for all 
seizures of the person to permitting police officers to briefly seize 
individuals based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has 
resulted in more innocent people being stopped.190 This creates 
the potential for hostility against law enforcement and bogs down 
the criminal justice system. 
I agree with Reinert that courts engaging in reasonableness 
balancing should be open to considering collective harms of the 
kind he identifies. The problem with his proposal is that it does 
not adequately respond to two of the problems associated with the 
current reasonableness balancing test—lack of guidance and 
overly broad discretion. It simply adds more things for the 
reviewing court to consider in the overall reasonableness 
balancing mix. 
A third way reasonableness with teeth review might be 
implemented is through a framework of presumptions. Under 
such a framework, courts would assess the reasonableness of a 
search using a hybrid warrant preference-reasonableness 
approach. As it does under the warrant preference model, the 
reviewing court would start by asking whether the government 
agent was acting pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement other than special needs. If so, the court 
would presume the search was reasonable. If, however, the 
government agent did not procure a warrant, the reviewing court 
would need to assess the validity of the search by engaging in a 
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 188 Id. at 1491. 
 189 Id. at 1492-93. 
 190 Id. at 1493-94. 
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more rigorous form of reasonableness review than is employed 
today. In other words, the reviewing court would engage in 
reasonableness review with teeth. 
Instead of balancing the government’s interests against the 
individual’s interests or looking to framing era common law, the 
reviewing court would primarily consider three factors. It could 
consider a fourth factor only if the facts clearly suggested its 
presence. If the warrantless search did not fall within an 
established exception to the warrant requirement, the reviewing 
court would consider these factors to see if any one factor or 
combination of factors led to a presumption of unreasonableness. 
If, on the other hand, the warrantless search satisfied the 
requirements of an established exception to the warrant 
requirement, then the reviewing court would only be able to 
override the initial presumption of reasonableness of that search if 
the court found at least two factors leading to a presumption of 
unreasonableness. 
Under my proposed framework, the reviewing court would 
first consider the nature and scope of the intrusion. It would ask 
whether the search was highly intrusive or involved an intrusion 
into a repository for highly personal or private material or 
information. If so, the court would apply a presumption of 
unreasonableness. This first consideration recognizes that privacy 
is one of the core values protected by the Fourth Amendment.191 
One might question the wisdom of asking the reviewing court 
to consider whether the search involved an intrusion on privacy 
when presumably the court has already decided that the 
government intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and therefore conducted a search. The court, however, would not 
be revisiting the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This first 
inquiry does not ask whether the government intruded upon a 
                                                                                                                                  
 191 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of this 
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental 
officials.”);; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function 
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusions by the State.”);; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The 
security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core 
of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, it focuses on the nature 
and scope of the intrusion, using privacy as a metric. The mere 
fact that the government has intruded upon a reasonable 
expectation of privacy merely tells us that the Fourth Amendment 
is implicated. It does not tell us whether the government violated 
the Fourth Amendment. The Court has recognized that there are 
varying degrees of intrusiveness.192 While I disagree with the 
Court’s assumption that individuals have lessened expectations of 
privacy in their cars, the fact remains that the Court and many 
individuals consider the search of a home more intrusive than the 
search of an automobile in part because the home is a place where 
very private things are kept and where very private things are 
said and done.193 A strip search involving the viewing of private 
parts is considered more intrusive than a frisk of the outer 
clothing.194 Similarly, many would consider the search of a 
personal computer more intrusive than the search of a cigarette 
package.195 
                                                                                                                                  
 192 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 363 (2001) (noting that while both 
traffic stops and full custodial arrests “are seizures that fall within the ambit of the 
Fourth Amendment, the latter entails a much greater intrusion on an individual’s 
liberty and privacy interests”). 
 193 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (noting that “the right of 
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion” stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment (internal citations 
omitted)); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991) (noting the distinction made 
at early common law between the search of a dwelling house and the search of a 
moving vehicle). 
 194 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641-43 (2009) 
(distinguishing between the suspicion needed to search a backpack and outer clothes 
and the suspicion needed to conduct a strip search). 
 195 I am not completely comfortable with suggesting that the nature and scope of the 
intrusion should matter. In previous cases, the Court has refused to draw a distinction 
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers, explaining: 
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the 
same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a 
traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag 
or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official 
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). In prior work, I have supported the 
Court’s refusal to draw a distinction between worthy and unworthy containers. See 
Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops, supra note 120. 
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Second, the court would ask whether the search was 
supported by probable cause.196 If the officer lacked probable 
cause, the court would apply a presumption of unreasonableness. 
Many Fourth Amendment scholars wisely argue that probable 
cause must be a part of any Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis. Scott Sundby, for example, has stated, “[P]robable cause 
must be at the center of the Fourth Amendment universe.”197 
Similarly, George C. Thomas has argued that except in cases 
involving searches incident to arrest, police should only be allowed 
to search for evidence when they have probable cause to believe 
                                                                                                                                  
 196 Much has been written on the subject of probable cause. See, e.g., Bruce A. 
Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569 (2007) (noting how the 
War on Terror has resulted in the erosion and neglect of probable cause); Sherry F. 
Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical versus Concrete Harms, 
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (2010) (assessing whether there is a legal or moral 
difference between arresting two people, each based on 50/50 odds of guilt, on the one 
hand, and arresting two people, one of whom is definitely innocent and the other of 
whom is definitely guilty, when the officer cannot tell which is innocent and which is 
guilty); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 
(2003) (arguing for a sliding scale of probable cause that takes into account the gravity 
of the investigated offense and the intrusiveness of the proposed search as part of the 
reasonableness framework); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable 
Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913 (2009) (arguing that the magistrate should consider the 
track record of both the individual police officer as well as the officer’s unit for 
establishing probable cause in the past when deciding whether to issue a warrant); 
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV. 377 
(2011) (explaining that probable cause in the framing era was merely a pleading 
requirement, not the evidentiary threshold that it represents today); Andrew E. 
Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and 
Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145 (2010) 
(defining probable cause as “having four components: one quantitative (How certain 
must the police be?), one qualitative (How strong must the supporting data sources 
be?), one temporal (When must police and courts make their judgments?), and one 
moral (Do the police have ‘individualized suspicion’?)”);; Arcila, In the Trenches, supra 
note 27 (arguing that probable cause during the framing era did not play a central role 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Colb, The Qualitative Dimensions of Fourth 
Amendment “Reasonableness,” supra note 66, at 1673-77 (arguing that if the offense of 
investigation is a minor offense, a more stringent showing of probable cause should be 
required and that in cases involving serious governmental intrusions, probable cause 
alone should not be sufficient to justify a search); Kinports, Diminishing Probable 
Cause, supra note 5 (arguing that by using phrases such as “reasonable belief” and 
“reason to believe” when analyzing probable cause, the Supreme Court is risking 
indirectly combining the higher standard of probable cause with the lower standard of 
reasonable suspicion). 
 197 Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar 
and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1998). 
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the search will produce evidence of a crime.198 Thomas notes that 
requiring probable cause to make a search avoids the harm of 
suspicionless searches and the risk that government officials will 
abuse their power.199 
Probable cause alone, however, should not automatically lead 
to a finding that the search was reasonable. Under current 
doctrine, probable cause is all that is needed to search a car.200 
Even if the police have time to get a warrant, they are not 
required to do so under the automobile exception.201 Arguably, it is 
not reasonable to search a car that is not readily mobile without 
obtaining prior judicial authorization.202 Under current law, 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense, 
even a fine-only offense like a seatbelt violation, is sufficient for an 
officer to effectuate a custodial arrest of the individual, which in 
turn gives the officer the ability to search the individual and any 
containers on the individual.203 The officer who arrested Gail 
Atwater had probable cause to believe she had violated the law 
requiring the wearing of a seatbelt, yet many would dispute the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that her arrest was reasonable.204 
Third, the reviewing court would ask whether it was 
impracticable for the police officer to get a warrant prior to 
                                                                                                                                  
 198 George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercraft, and the Framers: James 
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1451, 1459 & 1478 (2005); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized 
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 483, 627 (1995) (arguing that individualized suspicion should be a component of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis because it “recognizes the historical 
importance of individualized suspicion to the framers of the Constitution, and it 
provides needed guidance to courts and governmental officials, avoiding the slippery 
slope of an unprincipled reasonableness analysis”). 
 199 Thomas, supra note 198, at 1479. 
 200 Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (holding that probable cause alone 
satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment). 
 201 Id. at 466-67. 
 202 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has ruled that a car search based solely on 
probable cause is reasonable even if the car is not mobile. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 
465 (1999) (reversing a state court decision that held that in order for the automobile 
exception to apply, there had to be not only probable cause to believe that evidence of a 
crime was in the automobile, but a separate finding of exigency). 
 203 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 204 Wayne A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s 
Dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. 115 (2009). 
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searching. Here, the court would want to consider the danger to 
the officer or the public and risk to the investigation if the officer 
had stopped to get a warrant. If stopping to get a warrant would 
have posed little or no danger to the officer, the public, or the 
investigation, then the court should apply a presumption of 
unreasonableness. 
As an additional consideration, the reviewing court could ask 
whether the officer acted in good faith or bad faith. Evidence that 
the officer was acting in bad faith could also result in a 
presumption of unreasonableness. Bad faith can be reflected in 
various ways.205 If, for example, there is evidence that the officer 
was using the fact that an individual committed a traffic violation 
as the justification for a stop when the real reason the officer 
wanted to stop the individual was because the officer had a mere 
hunch that the individual was involved in illegal activity, this 
would be an indication that the officer acted in bad faith. 
Likewise, any evidence that the officer was motivated by a desire 
to harass would suggest bad faith. If the officer claimed he entered 
a home in order to render emergency aid to an injured person 
within, but there is evidence that the officer was more concerned 
with whether the occupants of the house were engaged in criminal 
activity than whether anyone was in need of emergency aid, this 
would also be an indication of bad faith. If there is any indication 
that the officer was motivated by race, gender, class, or sexual 
orientation bias, this would suggest bad faith and result in a 
presumption of unreasonableness. 
Consideration of the subjective intent of the officer, however, 
runs contrary to current law. The Supreme Court, on many 
occasions, has said that the good faith or bad faith of the officer is 
irrelevant to the constitutionality of the police action.206 The 
                                                                                                                                  
 205 John Burkoff defines bad faith in the search context as occurring “when the 
police officer who is searching acts entirely and deliberately for reasons that do not 
constitute a proper legal justification for the search.” John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith 
Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 101 (1982) (arguing that even if objective reasons exist 
to support a search, if the officer’s sole reason for engaging in the search was an 
improper reason, the officer’s bad faith should render the search unconstitutional). 
 206 Kentucky v. King, 131 U.S. 1849, 1859 (2011) (opining that considering whether 
the police in bad faith intentionally created an exigent circumstance to get around the 
warrant requirement “is fundamentally inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence” which rejects a subjective approach and asks only whether the action 
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Court’s position on subjective intent is a bit hypocritical. Under 
current doctrine, the government’s purpose in establishing a 
suspicionless search regime is considered a relevant factor in 
determining whether there was a special need above and beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement,207 but the individual police 
officer’s purpose in stopping or searching an individual is 
considered irrelevant.208 In other words, the government’s “good” 
purpose is relevant when it can help the government, but the 
government’s “bad” purpose is irrelevant when considering it 
might help the defendant.209 
Defenders of the Court’s position might argue it is difficult to 
prove intent and therefore it is best to stick with objective factors 
when trying to assess questions of reasonableness. While it may 
be difficult to discern the subjective intent of the government 
actor, this does not stop us from requiring proof of intent in other 
areas of the law. For example, the concept of mens rea is a long-
established tradition in substantive criminal law where proof of 
intent is the general rule and liability without intent is the 
exception.210 Moreover, it makes sense to consider the bad faith of 
government actors when the question is the overall 
reasonableness of a search. How can a search be considered 
reasonable if the officer’s reason for engaging in the search was to 
                                                                                                                                  
was objectively justified); Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (rejecting 
argument that reviewing court assessing reasonableness of entry into a home under 
the emergency aid doctrine ought to consider whether the officers were truly motivated 
primarily by a desire to save lives and property); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”). 
 207 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (noting that what 
distinguishes permissible checkpoints from impermissible checkpoints is their primary 
purpose). 
 208 Id. 
 209 A distinction might be drawn between programmatic purposes, which is what 
the Court is assessing in special needs cases, and an individual officer’s purpose in 
engaging in a particular search. In other contexts, however, the Court displays similar 
bias. For example, the Court requires a defendant challenging his conviction on the 
ground that the government failed to preserve exculpatory evidence to prove that the 
police acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). It does not require 
the government to prove the police acted in good faith. 
 210 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an 
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or 
transient notion.”). 
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harass? How can a search be considered reasonable if the officer’s 
real reason for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity was 
the defendant’s race? 
My framework of presumptions approach marries the 
warrant preference and reasonableness models of the Fourth 
Amendment, recognizing that both approaches carry considerable 
advantages. In requiring prior judicial authorization for a search 
unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the 
warrant preference model reflects the importance of having a 
neutral third party assess the lawfulness of governmental action 
that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy. The 
reasonableness model, on the other hand, reflects the importance 
of giving both law enforcement officials and judicial officers broad 
discretion to decide when a warrantless search is appropriate. My 
hybrid model recognizes the importance of prior judicial 
authorization for a search in two ways. First, it allows the 
reviewing court to presume that searches that take place with a 
search warrant are reasonable. Second, it ensures that a court 
reviews the validity of the search at some stage of the process—
either pre-search if a warrant is obtained or post-search since all 
warrantless searches would be subject to reasonableness with 
teeth review. My hybrid model also recognizes the importance of 
giving reviewing courts broad discretion. This is why my proposal 
uses a framework of rebuttable presumptions rather than rigid 
rules.211 
My approach differs from the Court’s current approach to 
reasonableness in several respects. First, the current approach to 
reasonableness is largely a balancing test that weighs the 
                                                                                                                                  
 211 Presumptions are a staple of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and an 
important source of guidance to lower courts on a variety of issues. For example, the 
Court has held that lower courts deciding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment should presume the competence of the trial attorney. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance . . . .”). It has directed lower courts deciding whether to dismiss 
an indictment on the ground of selective prosecution to apply a presumption that the 
prosecutor has not violated equal protection. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
465 (1996) (“In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal 
protection, a criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence to the contrary.’”). 
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government’s interests against the individual’s interest.212 The 
current approach de-emphasizes the importance of warrants and 
focuses instead on whether, as a general matter, the challenged 
governmental action ought to be considered reasonable213 or 
whether it was unlawful at common law. 214 My hybrid model of 
reasonableness, in contrast, recognizes the importance of having a 
neutral third party assess the appropriateness of the search ex 
ante. Not only does my hybrid model start by asking whether 
there was a warrant, it incorporates one of the key components of 
the warrant process, probable cause, into its inquiry and forces 
the reviewing court to consider whether the officers could have 
gotten a warrant. 
Second, aside from instructing lower courts to look to the 
common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the 
current approach provides little guidance to lower courts as to 
what factors they ought to consider when assessing the 
reasonableness of the search. Under the current approach, if the 
challenged action was not unlawful at the time of the framing, the 
reviewing court is supposed to balance the governmental interests 
against the individual’s interests.215 Balancing, however, is 
problematic in today’s world because it is likely to lead to a finding 
of reasonableness whenever the government claims a national 
security interest or an interest in protecting the public. Popular 
today is the notion that individuals ought to be willing to sacrifice 
some inconvenience and imposition on their privacy interests in 
the service of the larger collective good, an idea expressed by 
Joseph Grano more than twenty-five years ago.216 
By specifying which factors ought to be considered relevant, 
my proposed approach provides lower courts with some guidance 
as to when they should deem a search unreasonable without 
                                                                                                                                  
 212 See supra note 34. 
 213 See supra notes 27-46. 
 214 See supra note 47-51. 
 215 See supra note 51. 
 216 Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of 
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 497 (1984) (suggesting the need for a 
community model under which individuals “who share[] the benefits of community 
living may legitimately be expected to make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the 
community’s efforts to solve and control crime”). 
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telling them how they must rule. The presumptions I propose are 
rebuttable, and the ultimate decision is left with the reviewing 
court. Moreover, my proposal forces courts to be more transparent 
about why they think a given search is or is not reasonable. 
My proposed framework also recognizes that criminal 
defendants are a politically powerless group in need of enhanced 
judicial protection.217 Just as the Court recognized in footnote four 
of the Carolene Products case that the federal judiciary is uniquely 
positioned to protect the rights of “discrete and insular 
minorities,”218 the current Court should recognize that criminal 
defendants as a group are unlikely to have their interests 
protected by the popularly elected legislature or executive. 
One might object to my proposal on the ground that it does 
not resolve problems of ambiguity and overly broad discretion 
inherent in the current approach but merely pushes back the 
reasonableness determination to a later time. While I agree that 
my proposal does not provide a magic bullet formula for 
determining whether and when a search is reasonable, it provides 
better assistance to lower courts than the current model by 
narrowing the list of relevant factors they should consider. The 
proposed framework not only identifies these factors, it also 
specifies how these factors should be viewed through a series of 
presumptions. 
Let’s think about how my proposed framework would work in 
practice. Let’s say police officer Peter has had several run-ins with 
an individual named Adam and wants to harass Adam because 
Adam called him a pig during their last encounter. Peter calls his 
precinct and asks the clerk to check if there are any outstanding 
arrest warrants for Adam’s arrest. When he receives a negative 
response, Peter calls the neighboring precinct’s clerk and asks the 
same question despite departmental regulations instructing line 
officers not to call clerks in other precincts without prior 
authorization from one’s supervisor.219 This time, the clerk tells 
                                                                                                                                  
 217 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 218 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 219 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts in Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135 (2009). Unlike in Herring, the clerk in my hypothetical accurately tells Officer 
Peter that there is an outstanding warrant for Adam’s arrest based on his failure to 
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him there is an outstanding warrant for Adam’s arrest based on 
his failure to pay three recent parking tickets. Armed with this 
information, Peter may arrest Adam in public.220 Once Peter 
arrests Adam and takes him into custody, Peter may conduct a 
full search of Adam’s person.221 If Peter finds a smart phone in 
Adam’s jacket pocket, Peter not only may seize the smart phone, 
he may also search its contents, looking at Adam’s text messages, 
e-mails, Facebook entries, photographs, and even bank account 
information. 
Under current law, the warrantless search of Adam’s smart 
phone found on Adam’s person would likely be deemed lawful 
under the search incident to arrest doctrine as long as the arrest 
was lawful and custodial and the search took place substantially 
contemporaneously with the arrest.222 Since there was an 
outstanding warrant for Adam’s arrest, the arrest would be 
considered lawful. The search was substantially contemporaneous 
with the arrest, and the smart phone was found on Adam’s person. 
Even if Adam password protected his smart phone, this would not 
necessarily prevent the officer from hacking into the smart phone 
or forcing him to reveal the password.223 An alternate justification 
supporting the warrantless search of a smart phone found on an 
                                                                                                                                  
pay three parking tickets. In Herring, the clerk erroneously reported to the officer that 
there was an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. at 137-38. 
 220 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
 221 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (authorizing full search of the 
person, including containers found on the person, incident to a lawful, custodial arrest). 
 222 See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (allowing 
warrantless viewing of text messages on cell phones seized incident to arrest); United 
States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009) (noting “trend heavily in 
favor of finding that the search incident to arrest” doctrine applies to cell phones). But 
see State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (rejecting application of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones). Over the past few years, the vast majority of 
courts that have assessed the constitutionality of police searching of cell phones 
incident to arrest, have approved of the practice. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password 
Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2011). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether an 
exception to the search incident to arrest doctrine ought to be recognized for 
warrantless searches of cell phones found on or near a person who has been arrested 
and taken into custody. Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause 
Courts to Reconsider Fourth Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 233, 237 (2010). 
 223 Gershowitz, supra note 222. 
2012] REASONABLENESS WITH TEETH 49 
arrestee’s person is the exigent circumstances exception.224 Police 
may worry that if they wait to search the smart phone, a 
confederate might remotely wipe the phone of its contents. 
Under my proposed framework, the reviewing court would 
start by asking whether the search took place with a warrant or 
fell within an established exception to the warrant requirement. 
Here, even though Peter acted without a search warrant, the 
search falls within the search incident to arrest exception. 
Accordingly, the search enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 
that can be overcome only if the reviewing court finds at least two 
factors pointing to a presumption of unreasonableness in its 
review for overall reasonableness. In this review, the court would 
first consider three factors: (1) the nature and scope of the 
intrusion, (2) whether the officer had probable cause to believe 
evidence of a crime would be found in the smart phone, and (3) 
whether it was impracticable for the officer to get a warrant. If 
there is clear evidence of bad faith, the reviewing court could also 
consider the officer’s bad faith. 
The reviewing court could first find that the search of a smart 
phone is extremely intrusive given the vast amounts of personal 
information a smart phone is capable of storing. Second, in this 
case, it does not appear that the officer had any specific and 
articulable facts leading him to believe that the smart phone he 
searched contained any incriminating evidence. Adam was 
arrested because he had three outstanding parking tickets. It was 
not likely that Adam’s smart phone would yield any further 
evidence supporting the offense of arrest. Third, it was not 
impracticable for Peter to have gotten a search warrant to search 
the smart phone. Once Peter had possession of the smart phone 
and took Adam in custody, it was unlikely that Adam would be 
able to destroy any evidence on the smart phone, unless he had 
access to a computer or could call an accomplice and tell the 
accomplice to wipe the smart phone. Additionally, Peter’s purpose 
in arresting and searching Adam was to harass Adam for calling 
him a pig, suggesting bad faith. All of these factors would point to 
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a presumption that the search was unreasonable, overriding the 
initial presumption of reasonableness, and allowing the court to 
find the search unconstitutional. 
One problem with my framework of presumptions approach 
is that it does not work so well in the case of administrative 
searches. This is because in most administrative search cases, 
there is no individualized suspicion or probable cause, suggesting 
a presumption of unreasonableness, but it is also impracticable to 
obtain a search warrant in advance, suggesting a presumption of 
reasonableness. These two factors cancel each other out, leaving 
the court to consider the nature and scope of the intrusion. The 
problem here is that just considering the nature and scope of the 
intrusion without also considering the government’s interests may 
lead to balancing with the thumb on the scale in favor of the 
individual rather than fair balancing. Moreover, evidence of bad 
faith will only be present in a limited number of cases. More 
attention needs to be paid to the question of how to implement 
less deferential review of administrative searches, but I will leave 
that question to another day. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has moved away from reading the Fourth 
Amendment as expressing a preference for warrants to 
understanding it as requiring only reasonableness, not warrants. 
The Court today stands at a crossroads. It can completely replace 
the warrant preference model with the reasonableness model of 
the Fourth Amendment, as it has already done in a few cases; it 
can return to a robust embrace of the warrant preference view; or 
it can recognize the virtues of the warrant preference and the 
reasonableness models and improve upon both. Because the Court 
is unlikely to return to a robust embrace of warrants, I argue that 
the Court should continue its current path of recognizing both 
models. Instead of extremely deferential pro-government 
reasonableness balancing, however, I argue that courts should 
engage in a more stringent form of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness review. Courts assessing the reasonableness of a 
Fourth Amendment search should employ reasonableness review 
with teeth. 
 
